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Oceania was at war with Eastasia: Oceania had always been
at war with Eastasia. A large part of the political literature of
five years was now completely obsolete. Reports and records of all
kinds, newspapers, books, pamphlets, films, sound tracks, photo-
graphs-all had to be rectified at lightning speed. Although no
directive was ever issued, it was known that the chiefs of the De-
partment intended that within one week no reference to the war
with Eurasia, or the alliance with Eastasia, should remain in ex-
istence anywhere.
George Orwell
1984
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a common occurrence. An individual, frequently a young
person, is arrested for a criminal offense, and the charges are dis-
posed of without a conviction. This disposition appears favorable
until the person realizes that there is an arrest record on file that
will create problems every time he or she seeks employment, ap-
plies for a professional license, or attempts to obtain a security
clearance. Is there a way to remedy this situation? The answer is
yes. The person can seek expungement of the criminal record. In
fact, expungement may even be granted when the person has been
convicted of an offense.
In many cases, our concept of fundamental fairness may ap-
pear to require expungement of the criminal record. Policy consid-
erations, as well as factors such as the demonstrated innocence of
the defendant, would seem to dictate that the person be spared the
lifetime adverse effects of a criminal record. But the remedy of ex-
pungement is not without problems. In theory and in practice, it
may be anomalous, if not impossible, for the courts to engage in
the Orwellian exercise of rewriting history. The arrest or conviction
having in fact occurred, it may be disingenuous to attempt to erase
it from the historical record and pretend that it never happened.
Problems also arise on a more practical level. There is the difficult
question of whether the beneficiary of an expungement order
should be permitted to deny under oath that the arrest or convic-
tion occurred. Seldom, if ever, will the law be a party to excusing,
much less promoting, perjurious testimony. On the other hand, ex-
pungement is of little value if its salutary effect can be overcome
merely by requiring that the person provide a notarized statement
regarding his or her criminal history. Legitimate concerns arise as
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to whether the fact of the arrest or conviction should be concealed
from those responsible for evaluating the person's fitness for sensi-
tive positions such as judgeships, high level executive branch ap-
pointments, or admission to the bar. These are but a few of the
fascinating issues raised by the use of this procedure.
It is doubtful whether questions relating to the place of ex-
pungement in our jurisprudence will be adequately resolved with-
out federal legislation. The United States Supreme Court has pro-
vided an indication that federal authorities may not be bound by
state expungement orders.' As a result, the beneficiary of such an
order may be required to reveal the criminal history to federal au-
thorities, and the record could possibly be considered at federal
sentencing proceedings. Equally important, federal agencies such
as the FBI may be justified in maintaining records of arrests or
convictions that have been expunged on the state level. If so, the
efficacy of state expungement orders would be substantially
diminished.
While federal courts have addressed the issue of expungement,
neither the term nor its application has ever been adequately de-
fined. Similarly situated individuals have received disparate treat-
ment, and it appears that if left to the courts, the area will remain
turbid. Only a clear statement of policy in the form of federal leg-
islation will resolve these issues and ensure just and consistent
results.
This Article will begin with an examination of the policy con-
siderations relating to expungement of criminal records. Next, it
will review the criteria considered in the individual case, proce-
dural matters, and the effects of the remedy. Finally, this Article
will review the problems that currently exist and discuss the need
for federal legislation.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Our views of expungement are driven and shaped by a number
of policy considerations, and a clear understanding of those consid-
erations is important to our discussion. As noted above, it is theo-
' See Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 114-22 (1983). In Dickerson,
the Court held that in prosecutions under federal gun control laws requiring a prior convic-
tion, federal authorities are not bound by state expungement orders. Id. Although the hold-
ing relates only to the existence of a predicate offense in a federal criminal prosecution, the
case has much broader implications. See infra text accompanying notes 130-39.
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retically and practically impossible to alter a historical fact, and
any attempt to do so can lead to a number of problems.
The expungement of a criminal record will be of little value if
anyone acknowledges the record's existence. Although a court may
provide for redaction or removal of physical records, expungement
will be effective only if all parties, including the courts, engage in
what can only be characterized as deception. A person whose crim-
inal record has been expunged must be permitted to lie under
oath, even in court proceedings, and to deny that he or she has a
criminal history. This deception, however, places the court in the
unseemly position of not only authorizing perjury, but also know-
ingly accepting the perjury as truthful testimony. The problem is
then compounded by the realization by jurors and other citizens
who have been exposed to media accounts of the prior arrest or
conviction that the court is condoning perjury, which thereby fur-
ther impugns the credibility of the court.2 This is but one example
of the multitude of difficulties created by an attempt to rewrite
history.'
The use of expungement can lead to other concerns, some re-
lating to the protection of the public at large. In most jurisdictions,
the licensing of professionals in fields such as law, medicine, phar-
macy, and accounting includes a review of criminal records to in-
sure that the applicant is a person of integrity and deserving of the
public trust. Serious problems may arise if the applicant's criminal
record has been expunged. It is possible that members of a licens-
ing board may receive information about the expunged record in-
dependently from another source, thus placing the board members
in a difficult position. It is more likely, however, that the board will
be totally unaware of these incidents, raising even greater con-
cerns. One need only consider the public outcry that would ensue
if it were revealed that a person with an expunged fraud conviction
was thereafter admitted to .practice law and proceeded to defraud
2 This concept is analogous to a situation in which two witnesses to an event agree to
testify falsely about the event. Their agreed version appears truthful unless one of them
breaks the agreement or a third witness appears. In that case, the falsity of the agreed
version may be exposed and the credibility of those so testifying destroyed. See infra text
accompanying notes 121-26; see also Steven K. O'Hern, Note, Expungement: Lies That Can
Hurt You In and Out of Court, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 574, 582-84 (1988) (discussing ethical and
practical effects of government-sanctioned lies).
' See Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1972). "The judicial editing of
history is likely to produce greater harm than that sought to be corrected." Id.
[Vol. 66:73
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his or her clients.4 Similar problems can arise with regard to candi-
dates for public office.'
Criminal records, including fingerprints, are of invaluable as-
sistance to law enforcement in identifying perpetrators of criminal
offenses.' Fingerprints provide one of the few methods of positive
identification, but only if the latent print left at the crime scene
can be compared with a known print. The known print is usually
obtained from criminal records. 7 Also, perpetrators of serial of-
fenses or repeat offenses involving a similar modus operandi, such
as murder, rape, or child abuse, are frequently identified by con-
sulting records of prior incidents.8 Here again, it would undoubt-
edly become a matter of grave public concern if it came to light
that the identification of a murderer, rapist, or child abuser was
delayed, and additional innocent persons were victimized, because
expunged criminal records or fingerprints were unavailable to the
investigating authorities.
Most jurisdictions have statutes requiring that a specified gov-
ernment agency maintain records of arrests and convictions."
Courts have questioned the propriety of expunging criminal
records in contravention of this statutory mandate, particularly in
Cf. United States v. Lopez, 704 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (licensing board
for private investigators should have access to arrest record); Commonwealth v. Richardson,
511 A.2d 827, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (important to ensure availability of cab drivers'
criminal records). See generally O'Hern, supra note 2, at 584-95 (discussing potential dan-
ger to public resulting from licensing boards' lack of awareness of expunged criminal
records).
' See infra text accompanying notes 120-25.
6 United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907
(1978); United States v. Johnson, 714 F. Supp. 522, 524 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United States v.
Rosen, 343 F. Supp. 804, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968,
970-71 (D.P.R. 1967). For this reason, some courts and legislatures have permitted expunged
records to be available to law enforcement. See, e.g., Doe v. Webster,'606 F.2d 1226, 1239-41
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (permitting records of convictions expunged pursuant to Federal Youth
Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5021(b) (repealed 1984), to be available to law enforcement);
State ex rel. Knight v. Barnes, 723 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (Missouri by stat-
ute provides that records will be available to law enforcement and court personnel).
Cf. Rosen, 343 F. Supp. at 809 (noting importance of fingerprint records and other
records in combatting crime).
I See Webster, 606 F.2d at 1243 (noting importance of police access to criminal records
in cases involving similar modus operandi); Commonwealth v. McKee, 516 A.2d 6, 9 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986) (same), appeal denied, 527 A.2d 537 (Pa. 1987).
1 Courts have noted that Congress recognized the need for maintenance of criminal
records by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (1988). See Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 539; Johnson, 714
F. Supp. at 524; Rowlett v. Fairfax, 446 F. Supp. 186, 188 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
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the absence of specific statutory authority for expungement.'0 Fi-
nally, it has also been noted that the expungement procedure
places a substantial burden on law enforcement, a burden that is
increased if the records have been disseminated to a number of
agencies.1
There are, however, equally cogent arguments in favor of ex-
pungement. History is, unfortunately, replete with examples of ar-
rests that were effected solely for purposes of harassment. The
records of those arrests remain with those arrested throughout
their lives, impugning their reputations, 2 adversely affecting em-
ployment opportunities, 3 and arousing the suspicion of law en-
forcement officers with regard to future and unrelated incidents. 4
The existence of the baseless arrest record may be brought out in
court proceedings, 15 or haunt the individual in other ways. The
person may encounter difficulties in securing a professional li-
cense,' 6 obtaining a security clearance, 1 procuring government
" See, e.g., Loder v. San Diego Mun. Court, 553 P.2d 624, 636 (Cal. 1976) (expunge-
ment granted only when legislature has provided remedy), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1109
(1977); State ex rel. Peach v. Tillman, 615 S.W.2d 514, 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (same);
Stanton v. State, 686 P.2d 587, 589 (Wyo. 1984) (expungement in absence of statute would
encroach upon legislative authority and executive pardoning power).
" See Crow v. Kelley, 512 F.2d 752, 755 (8th Cir. 1975) (great administrative burden
placed on FBI); United States v. Lopez, 704 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (requiring
expungement each time case is dismissed would place "onerous burden" on law
enforcement).
" See Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (social stigma associated
with arrest record); Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (same); Johnson,
714 F. Supp. at 524 (same); Sadiqq v. Bramlett, 559 F. Supp. 362, 366 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(same). But cf. Lopez, 704 F. Supp. at 1057 (injury to reputation is not grounds for ex-
pungement but only a factor to be considered).
" See Saxbe, 498 F.2d at 1024 (criminal record can have adverse effect on employment
opportunities); Mitchell, 430 F.2d at 490 (same); Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d
728, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (speculating that main evil of dissemination of arrest records is
adverse effect on job opportunities); Johnson, 714 F. Supp. at 524 (concluding that eco-
nomic losses may result from lost opportunities for schooling or employment); Sadiqq, 559
F. Supp. at 366 (same); see also United States v. Stromick, 710 F. Supp. 613, 614 (D. Md.
1989) (expungement may be appropriate when individual can demonstrate denial of specific
job opportunity). But cf. Lopez, 704 F. Supp. at 1057 (loss of employment is not grounds for
expungement but only a factor to be considered).
" See Saxbe, 498 F.2d at 1024 (person with criminal record more apt to come under
police scrutiny); Mitchell, 430 F.2d at 491 (criminal record may affect decision whether to
arrest or file charges); Sadiqq, 559 F. Supp. at 366 (individuals with arrest records more
vulnerable to police scrutiny concerning later criminal activity).
"s Courts have noted that the presence of a criminal record may affect the defendant's
decision to testify as well as bail and sentencing. See Saxbe, 498 F.2d at 1024; Mitchell, 430
F.2d at 491.
" See Saxbe, 498 F.2d at 1024 (criminal record may affect license to engage in certain
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benefits,18 or retaining immigration status. 19 An annotation of the
record reflecting that the charges have been dismissed will not to-
tally eliminate the detrimental effects of the unlawful arrest. Nulli-
fication can be accomplished only if the record is expunged and the
individual is permitted to deny that the arrest occurred.20
Even in cases of a lawful arrest, it may be inappropriate to
expose the person to the adverse effects of a criminal arrest record
if the charges have been dismissed,2' the person has been acquitted
at trial,22 or the conviction has been reversed on appeal.2 The pre-
sumption of innocence provides a compelling argument that in the
absence of a conviction, a person should suffer no adverse conse-
quences as a result of an arrest.24 A more difficult question is
presented when a defendant's conviction has been affirmed on ap-
peal. However, the benefits of expungement have been afforded in
fields of work); Mitchell, 430 F.2d at 490 (criminal record may restrict or render nonexistent
opportunity for professional license); Johnson, 714 F. Supp. at 524 (economic losses may
result from lost opportunities for professional licenses); United States v. Bohr, 406 F. Supp.
1218, 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (granting expungement to individual seeking admission to bar).
:7 See Stromick, 710 F. Supp. at 614.
18 See, e.g., Dubuclet v. Division of Employment Sec., 483 So. 2d 1183, 1184 (La. Ct.
App.) (teacher discharged on basis of expunged conviction could be denied unemployment
compensation benefits), writ denied, 488 So. 2d 693 (La. 1986).
19 See United States v. Benlizar, 459 F. Supp. 614, 621-22 (D.D.C. 1978) (granting ex-
pungement to individual whose criminal record could have affected immigration status).
20 See Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1239-44 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (construing 18 U.S.C.
§ 5021(b) as permitting person whose conviction has been set aside under Federal Youth
Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (repealed 1984), to deny that conviction occurred).
21 See Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 434 A.2d 1205, 1206 (Pa. 1981) (granting expunge-
ment of arrest record after successful completion of accelerated rehabilitative disposition
program). An interesting issue arises in cases where charges have been dismissed because of
the suppression of evidence. See United States v. Bagley, 899 F.2d 707, 708 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 343 (1990) (expungement should not be granted in every case where dis-
missal results from suppressed evidence); see also infra note 58 and accompanying text.
22 See United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D.P.R. 1967) ("no public good is
accomplished by retention of criminal identification records" after acquittal or dismissal);
Commonwealth v. Capone, 422 A.2d 1383, 1385 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (presumption of inno-
cence precludes requiring acquitted defendant to prove nonculpability in expungement pro-
ceeding); infra note 51.
23 See Benlizar, 459 F. Supp. at 621-22 (granting expungement to individual whose con-
viction was reversed on appeal); Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211, 212 (W.D. Mich.
1971) (granting expungement to individual whose conviction was set aside pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255); Rambo v. Commissioner of Police, 447 A.2d 279, 281-82 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982) (granting expungement to individual whose conviction was reversed on appeal); infra
note 57.
2' See Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (adverse inference from
arrest record based on erroneous assumptions); Capone, 422 A.2d at 1385 (allowing pre-
sumption of innocence to preclude requiring acquitted defendant to prove nonculpability in
expungement proceeding).
19921
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such cases, particularly when the defendants were young at the
time of the offense and have since led an exemplary life. Here
again, the courts and legislatures have been concerned about the
adverse effects that a criminal record may have upon the individ-
ual's future, and have concluded that providing the defendant with
an opportunity to start anew with a clean record will promote
rehabilitation.25
III. BASES OF AUTHORITY FOR EXPUNGEMENT OF CRIMINAL
RECORDS
At the outset the court must determine what, if any, basis ex-
ists for its authority to grant expungement. This presents no prob-
lem if the legislature has enacted a statute specifically providing
for the remedy. However, on the federal level Congress has not
provided a general expungement statute.2 A few state courts have
held that a judicial grant of expungement in the absence of such a
statute would violate the doctrine of separation of powers .2  Yet,
the federal courts have not seen this as an obstacle to the exercise
of their authority. They have, instead, found other bases upon
which to grant the relief.
25 See, e.g., Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1239-41 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (construing 18
U.S.C. § 5021(b) as requiring that conviction set aside under the Federal Youth Corrections
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (repealed 1984), be partially expunged). But see Commonwealth
v. Cook, 518 A.2d 858, 860 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (quoting Commonwealth v. Magdon, 456
A.2d 194, 196 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) for proposition that due process right to expungement
hearing does not apply when defendant adjudged guilty). Expungement of convictions, how-
ever, then presents questions about the use of those convictions as predicates for other of-
fenses or for sentencing under habitual offender statutes. See Commonwealth v. Cremins,
514 A.2d 945, 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (in administering habitual offender statutes, state
has interest in maintaining records of conviction); see also infra text accompanying notes
143-48 (discussing whether federal authorities are bound by state expungement orders).
2 Congress has enacted statutes that deal with expungement in specific situations. For
example, 18 U.S.C. § 3607(c) provides for expungement of the criminal records relating to
certain minor narcotics offenses committed by first offenders under the age of twenty-one.
Congress also directed that state law on expungement be controlling under the federal gun
control laws. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(2) (1988); infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text; see
also 56 Fed. Reg. 22,762, 22,773 (1991) (commentary to amendments to Sentencing Guide-
lines for United States courts making definition of "prohibited person" dependent upon
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)). These statutes, however, are narrow in scope and pro-
vide neither a federal policy nor general authority for expungement.
2 State v. Gilkinson, 790 P.2d 1247, 1249-50 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (disposition of
criminal records is uniquely within legislative domain so court could not grant expungement
absent statutory grant of authority); Stanton v. State, 686 P.2d 587, 588-89 (Wyo. 1984)
(court-ordered expungement in absence of statute would have effect of pardon, thereby vio-
lating separation of powers doctrine).
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While occasionally noting that their authority for granting ex-
pungement may have a constitutional basis,28 federal courts have
most frequently based their decisions on their inherent equity
power. The courts view this common-law power as providing au-
thority to establish a remedy when necessary and appropriate to
preserve basic legal rights.29 Other decisions have been grounded
on statutes which, though not specifically providing for expunge-
ment, have been interpreted by the courts to afford the relief.
These statutes include the Privacy Act of 1974,30 the Civil Rights
28 Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (court may order expungement in
action brought directly under Constitution); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 64-65 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (rationalizing that expungement of criminal records is, under certain circumstances,
proper remedy in action brought directly under Constitution), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084
(1985). Other courts, however, have indicated that there is no constitutional right to ex-
pungement. E.g., Ortega v. Kansas City, 723 F. Supp. 1426, 1427 (D. Kan. 1989) (refusing to
accept existence of constitutional right to expungement); United States v. Johnson, 714 F.
Supp. 522, 523 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (expungement is not federal constitutional right); see also
McKnight v. Webster, 499 F. Supp. 420, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (no direct cause of action lies
against federal agency for mere possession of inaccurate or constitutionally tainted informa-
tion about individual's criminal record); Rowlett v. Fairfax, 446 F. Supp. 186, 188-89 (W.D.
Mo. 1978) (concluding that Supreme Court's decision in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)
foreclosed arguments for expungement on constitutional basis). Courts have also stated that
the mere retention of an arrest record does not violate any constitutional right of privacy.
See Herschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17, 20 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966); Antonelli
v. Burnham, 582 F. Supp. 1067, 1070-71 (E.D. ll. 1984); United States v. Rosen, 343 F.
Supp. 804, 807-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Usually, however, courts avoid predicating their deci-
sions on constitutional grounds when another basis is available. See Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507
F.2d 1116, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
29 See Saxbe, 498 F.2d at 1023 (judicial remedy of expungement is inherent and not
dependent on express statutory provision); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 968, 971 (D.C.
Cir.) (federal court in exercise of its equitable powers "may order the expungement of
records, including arrest records, when necessary and appropriate to preserve basic legal
rights"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); McKnight, 499 F. Supp. at 422 (same); United
States v. Henderson, 482 F. Supp. 234, 243 (D.N.J. 1979) (courts' equitable power of ex-
pungement not dependent on express statutory provision); United States v. Benlizar, 459 F.
Supp. 614, 623 (D.D.C. 1978) (court's equitable power to expunge based on common-law
principles); United States v. Bohr, 406 F. Supp. 1218, 1219 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (court's plenary
power to do complete justice includes authority to order expunction of criminal records);
Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211, 213 (W.D. Mich. 1971) (any challenge to court's
inherent power to order expungement is foreclosed by prior decision).
'0 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1988); see also Smith, 807 F.2d at 204 (court may order ex-
pungement of records in action brought under Privacy Act); Hobson, 737 F.2d at 64-65
(under proper circumstances, expungement of criminal records is permissible remedy for
agency's violation of Privacy Act). Conversely, mere retention of an arrest record has been
held not to violate any constitutional right of privacy. Herschel, 365 F.2d at 20; Antonelli,
582 F. Supp. at 1070-71. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that no infringement on a
privacy right results from the dissemination of an arrest record, even though the charges
have been dropped. Paul, 424 U.S. at 720.
1992]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:73
Act,31 and the Youth Corrections Act. 2 At least one court has
based its decision on the federal statute authorizing the Attorney
General to maintain arrest records.3
State courts have also taken different positions on this issue.
As noted above, several state courts have held that they have no
authority to grant expungement in the absence of a statute.34
Others have followed the federal approach and found that they
have the inherent power to order this relief.35 Most states, how-
ever, have enacted statutes that provide for expungement in cer-
tain well-defined situations.3 " In enacting such statutes, these state
legislatures have provided much needed guidance to the courts as
to both the policies that should govern expungement and the man-
ner in which it should be applied. The courts of these states have
split on the issue of whether such legislation precludes a judicial
grant of expungement in other situations.3 7
31 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see also Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58, 65 (W.D.N.C.
1969) (expunction granted pursuant to request for equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983),
vacated, 401 U.S. 987 (1971).
32 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (repealed 1984). The circuits split as to whether § 5021, the
set-aside provision of the Youth Corrections Act, provided statutory authority for expunge-
ment. See United States v. Stromick, 710 F. Supp. 613, 614 (D. Md. 1989).
3 See Saxbe, 498 F.2d at 1030 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 534 as precluding Identifica-
tion Division of FBI from maintaining in its criminal files, as arrest record, encounter with
police established not to constitute arrest); see also Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1122
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 534 as preventing government dissemination of
criminal information without reasonable precautions to ensure accuracy). But see Rowlett v.
Fairfax, 446 F. Supp. 186, 188-89 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (other courts view Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), as foreclosing this argument).
31 See, e.g., State v. Gilkinson, 790 P.2d 1247, 1249-50 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (in ab-
sence of statute, court lacks authority to grant expungement).
35 See, e.g., Bradford v. Mahan, 548 P.2d 1223, 1231 (Kan. 1976) (court has equitable
power to correct or expunge); State v. P.A.D., 436 N.W.2d 808, 810-11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(same); see also Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 434 A.2d 1205, 1206 (Pa. 1981) (petition for
expungement is adjunct of due process and not dependent upon express statutory author-
ity); In re Pflaum, 451 A.2d 1038, 1041 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (same).
11 See infra note 163 (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., 460 U.S. 103, 121
(1983)); infra notes 38-39.
17 Compare Gilkinson, 790 P.2d at 1249-50 (disposition of criminal records is uniquely
within legislature's domain and court may not grant expungement absent statutory grant of
authority) and Springer v. State, 621 P.2d 1213, 1218-19 (Or. Ct. App.) (state statutes did
not provide for expungement in situation where individual was arrested but not convicted,
and inherent power was not essential to judicial function), review denied, 631 P.2d 340 (Or.
1981) with State v. Stadler, 469 N.E.2d 911, 913 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (in addition to ex-
punging criminal record under statutes, court also has inherent power to expunge in excep-
tional or unusual cases).
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IV. CRITERIA FOR APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY
If it is determined that expungement of a criminal record is an
appropriate remedy and that a common-law, constitutional, or
statutory basis for a grant of expungement exists, the court must
then decide the circumstances under which the relief will be
granted. This presents few problems if the court has statutory
guidance.38 H6wever, if the statute does not set out the specific
situations where expungement should be granted,39 or the court is
proceeding solely on a common-law or constitutional basis,40 this
task may be difficult.
A few courts have attempted to simplify the task and to en-
sure equal treatment by compiling judicial lists of situations where
expungement will be appropriate. These lists typically include situ-
ations where the arrest was unlawful,4 ' where mass arrests ren-
dered judicial determination of probable cause impossible,42 where
the court determined that the sole purpose of the arrest was to
11 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3607(c) (1988) (authorizing expungement of records relating to
arrest and conviction of individuals under twenty-one years of age for simple possession of
small amount of controlled substance); State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987) (under Missouri statute, defendant was not entitled to expungement when he violated
probation by being convicted of subsequent vehicle offenses); State v. Bissantz, 532 N.E.2d
126, 128-29 (Ohio 1988) (although person convicted of bribery in public office could have
conviction expunged under Ohio statute, that conviction could still bar defendant from
holding public office); Springer, 621 P.2d at 1217-18 (expungement unavailable under appli-
cable Oregon statutes); In re Crepeau-Cross, 385 A.2d 658, 663 (R.I. 1978) (same for felony
convictions under applicable Rhode Island statute).
11 See, e.g., Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (court can order ex-
pungement under Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1988)); Hobson v. Wilson, 737
F.2d 1, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985). As previously noted,
the circuits are split as to whether the set-aside provisions of the Youth Corrections Act, 18
U.S.C. § 5021(a) (repealed 1984), required that the record be expunged. Compare United
States v. Doe, 859 F.2d 1334, 1335-36 (8th Cir. 1988) (18 U.S.C. § 5021(a) does not authorize
expunction of records) and United States v. Doe, 732 F.2d 229, 230-31 (lst Cir. 1984) (same)
with Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1238-45 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (18 U.S.C. § 5021(a) requires
expungement of criminal record) and United States v. Henderson, 482 F. Supp. 234, 238
(D.N.J. 1979) (same).
40 See supra notes 28-29; see also City of Bowling Green v. Logan, 532 N.E.2d 220, 222
(Bowling Green Mun. Ct. 1987) (although court has inherent authority to expunge arrest
record, it has no authority to expunge conviction).
41 See United States v. G., 774 F.2d 1392, 1394 (9th Cir. 1985) (court may order ex-
pungement if arrest was unlawful).
41 See Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 968-73 (D.C. Cir.) (expungement appropriate
if, because of mass arrests, government cannot demonstrate probable cause), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 880- (1973); United States v. Johnson, 714 F. Supp. 522, 524 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
(same).
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harass the defendant,4" where the authorities have misused crimi-
nal records to the detriment of the defendant,44 where the arrest,
although proper, was based upon a statute that was later declared
unconstitutional, 45 and where the expungement was necessary to
preserve basic human rights." The courts have expressed different
views as to whether these lists are exclusive or whether other
grounds may be considered.47 The rather broad terms also can lead
to difficulties in deciding whether a specific situation fits within
one of the delineated categories.
Most courts have eschewed such lists and have adopted the
position that the issue must be determined on a case-by-case ba-
sis. 48 While this approach has a certain appeal, it can lead to dispa-
rate holdings, and similarly situated individuals may receive dis-
similar treatment. For example, courts have taken different
positions as to the propriety of expungement when the defendant
has completed a pretrial diversion program,49 when the govern-
ment demonstrated probable cause prior to the dismissal of the
case, 50 and when the defendant was acquitted at trial.5' Similarly,
43 See G., 774 F.2d at 1394 (court may order expungement if arrest made merely to
harass); Johnson, 714 F. Supp. at 524 (same).
14 See Johnson, 714 F. Supp. at 524 (expungement proper if police misuse police
records to defendant's detriment).
" See G., 774 F.2d at 1394 (court may order expungement if statute under which indi-
vidual prosecuted later declared unconstitutional); Johnson, 714 F. Supp. at 524 (same).
46 See Johnson, 714 F. Supp. at 524 (expungement proper if necessary to preserve basic
legal rights).
4 Compare Diamond v. United States, 649 F.2d 496, 497-98 (7th Cir. 1981) (listed cir-
cumstances are only illustrative of situations if expungement is appropriate) with Johnson,
714 F. Supp. at 524 (implying that expungement is proper only if situation falls within one
of listed circumstances).
" See United States v. Bagley, 899 F.2d 707, 708 (8th Cir.) (district court should decide
expungement cases on case-by-case basis), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 343 (1990); Diamond, 649
F.2d at 497 (no definitive all-purpose rule governing grants of expungement exists, therefore
each case must stand on its own two feet).
49 Compare Gregg v. Commonwealth, 316 S.E.2d 741, 742-43 (Va. 1984) (successful
completion of pretrial diversion program does not permit expungement) with Canter v.
State, 448 So. 2d 64, 65-66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (successful completion of pretrial di-
version program permits expungement) and Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 434 A.2d 1205,
1206 (Pa. 1981) (same).
10 Compare Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (even if arrest was
made with probable cause, FBI may be under duty to supplement its files if defendant is
later exonerated) and United States v. Benlizar, 459 F. Supp. 614, 615 (D.D.C. 1978) (arrest
record may be expunged even if probable cause basis for arrest exists) with Drake v. State,
318 S.E.2d 721, 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (under Georgia statute indicted defendant not enti-
tled to expungement after entry of nolle prosequi).
51 Compare Geary v. United States, 901 F.2d 679, 680 (8th Cir. 1990) (mere acquittal
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the courts have reached different conclusions on the issue of
whether the federal government has a legal obligation to ensure
the accuracy of its records.5 2
Questions have also arisen as to whether expungement should
be granted when the defendant was found not guilty by reason of
insanity,53 when the defendant was convicted of prior or subse-
quent offenses,54 when a person was named in an indictment as an
unindicted co-conspirator, 5 when the person charged was shown to
be innocent,56 when a conviction was reversed on appeal,57 and
insufficient to warrant expunction) and United States v. Friesen, 853 F.2d 816, 818 (10th
Cir. 1988) (same) and United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927-28 (10th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975) and Sadiqq v. Bramlett, 559 F. Supp. 362, 366 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(same) and Coleman v. United States Dep't of Justice, 429 F. Supp. 411, 413 (N.D. Ind.
1977) (same) and State v. Sadler, 469 N.E.2d 911, 913 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (same) with
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 511 A.2d 827, 829-30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (on facts of case,
defendant's acquittal required expungement) and Commonwealth v. Rank, 459 A.2d 369,
371-72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (presumption of innocence entitled defendant to expungement
after acquittal).
52 Compare Crow v. Kelley, 512 F.2d 752, 755 (8th Cir. 1975) (although FBI has duty to
ensure accuracy of information it disseminates, constitutional validity of state court convic-
tions must be determined in state courts); Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1122-26, 1131
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (imposing some duty on FBI to ensure accuracy of information that it dis-
seminates) and Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1027-30 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (imposing duty on
FBI to prevent criminal identification files from containing inappropriate material) with
McKnight v. Webster, 499 F. Supp. 420, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (FBI's duty is fulfilled when it
makes request of local authorities for accurate information) and Coleman, 429 F. Supp. at
413 (FBI may not have duty to expunge criminal records).
11 See, e.g., State v. Salmon, 306 S.E.2d 620, 621 (S.C. 1983) (denying expungement
under South Carolina statute upon finding of not guilty by reason of insanity).
" See, e.g., People v. Blanchura, 440 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (under Michi-
gan statute defendant was not eligible for expungement when convicted of five counts of
perjury occurring over two days of testimony); State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) (under Missouri statute defendant was not eligible for expungement because he
pleaded guilty to subsequent vehicle offenses); State v. A.N.J., 487 A.2d 324, 328 (N.J. 1985)
(under New Jersey expungement statute multiple disorderly person convictions may be ex-
punged); State v. H.G.G., 494 A.2d 841, 848-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1985) (under New Jersey
statute expungement barred by prior fraud conviction); Commonwealth v. McKee, 516 A.2d
6, 9-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (prior criminal record was an important factor in denying ex-
pungement), appeal denied, 527 A.2d 537 (Pa. 1987).
"' See United States v. International Harvester Co., 720 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir. 1983)
(named but uncharged co-conspirator does not have right to expungement when charged
with same offenses in another indictment); United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 808 (5th
Cir. 1975) (named but uncharged co-conspirators have right to expungement of references to
them by name).
" Rambo v. Commissioner of Police, 447 A.2d 279, 281-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (de-
fendant whose conviction was reversed for insufficiency of evidence entitled to expunge-
ment); Gregg v. Commonwealth, 316 S.E.2d 741, 742-43 (Va. 1984) (Virginia expungement
statute applies only to innocent defendants).
"' See Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351, 1364 (10th Cir. 1977) (federal habeas corpus
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when a case was dismissed because of the suppression of evi-
dence.5 8 Finally, issues have been raised with regard to the applica-
bility of expungement to crimes committed by corporate defend-
ants,59 to records of mental commitments,6" and to environmental
crimes.6' Coijrts have, in individual cases, also given consideration
to the position taken by the prosecutor.6 2
The variety of situations in which the issue can arise, coupled
with the inconsonant court opinions, provide some indication of
the difficulty and complexity of the problem. While it is important
that the criteria for the grant of expungement be established, it is
equally important that the remedy be administered in a just and
equitable fashion. Rigid criteria, by their nature, exclude situations
that are worthy of consideration, but leaving the matter to the ab-
solute discretion of the courts leads to disparate results and une-
qual treatment. While legislation does not provide a complete an-
swer, it at least establishes the general criteria to be considered in
granting expungement. Equally important, the legislation itself
and the legislative history would provide policy guidelines to assist
the courts in reaching consistent decisions.
relief holding conviction invalid does not automatically require expungement of criminal
record), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); United States v. Benlizar, 459 F. Supp. 614, 621
(D.D.C. 1978) (granting expungement where conviction reversed on appeal); Kowall v.
United States, 53 F.R.D. 211, 213 (W.D. Mich. 1971) (granting expungement where convic-
tion set aside pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255); Commonwealth v. Miller, 473 A.2d 193, 194-95
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (federal habeas corpus relief holding conviction invalid qualified de-
fendant for expungement of criminal record); Rambo, 447 A.2d at 281-82 (defendant whose
conviction was reversed for insufficiency of evidence was entitled to expungement).
68 United States v. Bagley, 899 F.2d 707, 708 (8th Cir.) (affirming district court's denial
of expungement where case was dismissed because of suppression of evidence), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 343 (1990).
" See, e.g., State v. XYZ Corp., 575 A.2d 423, 426-27 (N.J. 1990) (corporations may
seek expungement of criminal records under New Jersey statute).
80 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. C.B., 452 A.2d 1372, 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (person
illegally committed to state mental institution has right to destruction of hospital records
created as result of illegal commitment); Commonwealth v. J.T., 420 A.2d 1064, 1065-66 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980) (records of commitment to mental institution originating as result of illegal
proceeding are subject to expungement).
0' See, e.g., XYZ Corp., 575 A.2d at 426-27 (corporations may seek expungement of
records of environmental crimes under New Jersey statute).
62 See United States v. Bohr, 406 F. Supp. 1218, 1219 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (expungement
granted where prosecutor did not oppose); see also United States v. Cook, 480 F. Supp. 262,
263-64 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (refusing to set aside expungement agreement entered into by
prosecutor).
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V. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RELATED ISSUES
If it is decided that expungement is an appropriate remedy,
that the court has a basis for granting the relief, and that the situ-
ation meets the court's criteria for issuing an expungement order, a
number of procedural issues must be considered. These issues are
of great importance both jurisprudentially and in practice. Deci-
sions on these issues may frequently be dispositive of the case.
A. Procedural Setting
Individuals have sought expungement of their criminal records
in a number of procedural settings. Perhaps the most common is
the filing of a motion for expungement in the original criminal ac-
tion that arose out of the charges. It has generally been held that
the courts have jurisdiction to consider such a motion as an ancil-
lary matter and to grant expungement when appropriate.0 3 Courts
have also found jurisdiction when direct actions have been filed
against the custodian of the criminal records.6 4 These direct ac-
tions have taken a number of forms, based both on statutes and
the inherent equity power of the court."5 Furthermore, attempts
have been made to seek expungement by bringing post-conviction
proceedings, but these efforts have met with mixed results.66
11 See United States v. G., 774 F.2d 1392, 1394 (9th Cir. 1985) (courts may have author-
ity to order expungement as part of their ancillary jurisdiction over original criminal action);
United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 538 (2d Cir. 1977) (court sitting in criminal prose-
cution has ancillary jurisdiction to issue protective orders regarding dissemination of arrest
records), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978); United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927 (10th
Cir.) (expungement requests may be considered in criminal proceeding in which arrestee
was acquitted), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975); Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d
728, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (court sitting in criminal proceeding had ancillary jurisdiction to
grant expungement); United States v. Johnson, 714 F. Supp. 522, 523 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (mo-
tion for expungement usually treated as matter ancillary to criminal action).
" See Linn, 513 F.2d at 927 (expungement actions may be brought directly against
actual custodian of records sought to be expunged); Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1131
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (individual may bring action against FBI seeking expungement of criminal
records maintained by that agency).
"' See Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (court may order expunge-
ment of records in action brought against custodian of records under Privacy Act); Tarlton,
507 F.2d at 1131 (individual may bring action against FBI seeking expungement of criminal
records maintained by that agency based upon agency's duty to ensure accuracy of its
records under 28 U.S.C. § 534); Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (ac-
tion may be brought directly against custodian of record based upon inherent power of
court).
"G See Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351, 1364 (10th Cir. 1977) (habeas corpus relief void-
ing conviction does not automatically result in expungement of conviction; rather, expunge-
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B. Forum
One of the most interesting procedural issues is the determi-
nation of the appropriate forum. Should the individual bring the
expungement action in federal court or state court, and what effect
will this decision have upon the relief available? The question is of
great practical significance, but it also implicates fundamental con-
siderations of federalism.
Procedural issues arise, at least in part, from the methods that
are employed in maintaining and disseminating criminal records.
The federal government maintains records relating to federal of-
fenses, 7 and the states maintain records of arrests and convictions
occurring in their own jurisdiction. 8 Therefore, if an action is
brought in federal court to expunge records pertaining to federal
offenses, or an action is brought in state court to expunge records
relating to an arrest or conviction in that state, conflicts rarely oc-
cur. However, the federal government also maintains records of
state arrests and convictions based on information provided by
state and local law enforcement agencies. 9 Issues of federalism are
raised when a party brings a federal action to expunge a state rec-
ord or a state action to expunge a federal record. Related issues
arise when a federal litigant seeks to expunge a federal record re-
lating to a state offense.7"
ment may be considered within court's discretion), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Linn,
513 F.2d at 927 (requests for expungement frequently made in post-conviction proceedings);
Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1972) (federal court's declaration that
conviction under city ordinance was unconstitutional improperly included order of expunge-
ment of city's criminal records). Since expungement of criminal records is a form of collat-
eral attack, the habeas corpus law on exhaustion of state remedies is a particularly persua-
sive if not controlling analogy. See Tarlton, 507 F.2d at 1127-28 & n.34.
" See, e.g., Menard, 498 F.2d at 1020-22 (describing FBI's record maintenance system).
"' See, e.g., Dunn v. Rulli, 531 A.2d 103, 104-05 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (noting that
Pennsylvania State Police maintain criminal records relating to state offenses). For purposes
of this Article, the term "state" includes both state and local governments.
" See Menard, 498 F.2d at 1020-22 (describing system of records maintained by FBI as
including state arrests and convictions).
"0 While problems would arise if an action were brought in state court to expunge a
federal conviction or arrest, it appears that the state courts would not have jurisdiction to
grant such a request. See Doe v. FBI, 718 F. Supp. 90, 97 n.7 (D.D.C. 1989) (noting that
state court has no authority to order FBI to expunge its records), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 936 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Schwab v. Gallas, 724 F. Supp.
509, 510-11 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (federal defendant could not seek expungement of federal
conviction on basis of Ohio expungement statute). But see State v. L.K., 359 N.W.2d 305,
308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (ordering FBI to return fingerprints, photographs, and other
identification data).
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The possibility exists that a federal court could declare a state
conviction void on constitutional or other grounds and order the
expungement of the state's records, particularly if the state record-
keeping agency has been made a party to the action.7 However,
considerations of comity and federalism have made the federal
courts reluctant to expunge state records.72 This reluctance has led
some federal courts to hold that they are without jurisdiction to do
so. Accordingly, they have dismissed federal cases seeking ex-
pungement of state records for failure to state a cause of action.7 3
A different issue is presented if a person brings an action in
federal court seeking to expunge a federal record relating to a state
arrest or conviction. It has been held that a federal court, based on
the duty of the federal agency to ensure the accuracy of its records,
may order the expungement of federal records of state arrests or
convictions. 74 However, other courts have questioned this approach
and have declined to order the expungement,7 5 especially when the
federal agency has taken steps to ensure that its records are accu-
rate.76 Federal courts have also held that cases relating to a state's
7' See Menard, 498 F.2d at 1025 (with local record-keeping agency as defendant in fed-
eral action, court can obtain any action needed on local records).
72 See Crow v. Kelley, 512 F.2d 752, 755 (8th Cir. 1975) (requiring that state courts be
afforded initial opportunity to pass upon validity of state's convictions in consideration of
federal-state comity); Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1127-28 & n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (con-
siderations of federal-state comity mandate that local court supervising arrest or entering
conviction make initial determination as to validity); Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084,
1084 (5th Cir. 1972) (federal court's "order requiring that all references to a conviction
which was overturned on constitutional grounds be struck from the city's official records....
was overbroad"); Antonelli v. Burnham, 582 F. Supp. 1067, 1070-71 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (because
of concerns of federalism, federal court will not expunge state criminal records in action
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Hearn v. Hudson, 549 F. Supp. 949, 957-58 (W.D. Va.
1982) (when federal court's order of expungement of local record would conflict unnecessa-
rily with state's administration of affairs, court must abstain from entering such order).
73 See Tarlton, 507 F.2d at 1127-28 & n.35 (in ordinary course, federal court has no
jurisdiction to order expungement of records from files of local governmental agencies); see
also Crow; 512 F.2d at 754-55 (federal court is without jurisdiction to entertain request for
expungement of allegedly invalid state convictions from federal criminal records).
7' See Tarlton, 507 F.2d at 1131 (FBI may have duty to ensure accuracy of information
in its files); Menard, 498 F.2d at 1030 (ordering expungement of FBI records relating to
individual's arrest by state officials based on FBI's duty to maintain accurate records).
71 See Crow, 512 F.2d at 754-56 (an action seeking expungement of allegedly invalid
state convictions cannot be initiated in federal court against federal record-keeping agency);
Rowlett v. Fairfax, 446 F. Supp. 186, 188-89 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (duty of federal agencies to
maintain accurate records may have been extinguished by Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976)).
76 See McKnight v. Webster, 499 F. Supp. 420, 422-24 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (FBI fulfilled
any duty to ensure accuracy of its files by forwarding requests for correct information to
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proceedings should first be brought in the courts of that state;
therefore, they have dismissed 'such cases initiated in federal court
for failure to exhaust state remedies.77
Similarly, it would appear that state courts are without juris-
diction to order expungement of federal records, even if those
records relate to state proceedings.78 However, at least one state
court has intimated that it may have the authority to do so.7e
C. Scope of the Expungement Order
Courts have generally been deemed to have authority to order
expungement of administrative, as well as criminal, records.80
However, problems may arise if a federal court attempts to ex-
punge state administrative records,8" a state court attempts to ex-
punge federal administrative records, 2 or a court otherwise lacks
local law enforcement agencies).
7 See Crow, 512 F.2d at 754-56 (dismissing action to expunge federal records of state
criminal conviction because more appropriate to initiate action in state court); Tarlton, 507
F.2d at 1127-28 & n.34 (because expungement of criminal records is form of collateral at-
tack, habeas corpus law on exhaustion of state remedies is "a particularly persuasive, if not
controlling, analogy"); Hearn v. Hudson, 549 F. Supp. 949, 957-58 (W.D. Va. 1982) (ab-
staining from entering expungement order regarding local records in action brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 because state courts should be permitted to implement their own expunge-
ment statute).
11 See Doe v. FBI, 718 F. Supp. 90, 97 n.7 (D.D.C. 1989) (state court has no authority to
order FBI to expunge its records), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 936 F.2d
1346 (D.C. Cir. 1991); cf. Schwab v. Gallas, 724 F. Supp. 509, 510-11 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (fed-
eral defendant could not seek expungement of federal conviction on basis of Ohio expunge-
ment statute).
79 See State v. L.K., 359 N.W.2d 305, 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (state court may order
"FBI to return fingerprints, photographs, and other identification data").
11 See Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d 1232, 1235-36 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (expungement may
be invoked when government records in question are administrative rather than criminal);
State v. P.A.D., 436 N.W.2d 808, 810-11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (all public arrest records,
including records held by all entities that gather this information, may be expunged); Com-
monwealth v. C.B., 452 A.2d 1372, 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (person who has been unlaw-
fully committed to state mental institution has right to destruction of hospital records "cre-
ated as a result of the illegal commitment"). But see Department of Pub. Safety v.
Woodhall, 376 N.W.2d 897, 899 (Iowa 1985) (Iowa statute providing court with authority to
expunge its own records does not authorize expungement of records maintained by execu-
tive branch); State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 361 (Minn. 1981) (court lacks inherent power to
order hospital under executive branch of government not to disclose information); Conroy v.
Department of Transp., 509 A.2d 941, 942 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (order addressed to keep-
ers of criminal records "does not embrace civil or administrative proceedings"), appeal de-
nied, 522 A.2d 51 (Pa. 1987).
" See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction over the agency in which the records are kept.83 Bar-
ring such problems, courts may expunge civil service records, 4
records of mental institutions," law enforcement personnel
records,86 and similar records of an administrative nature.
D. Hearing Requirement
The decision on expungement is generally entrusted to the
discretion of the trial judge, but this discretion is not without limi-
tation. 17 Frequently a hearing will be required. 8 In fact, the courts
of at least one state have held that the right to a hearing is af-
forded by the due process clause. 9 The record developed at the
hearing then permits an appellate court to examine the evidence
and determine whether expungement was appropriate in the par-
ticular case.9 0
E. Allocation of Burden of Proof
Courts have reached different conclusions on the allocation of
83 See, e.g., Rulli v. Dunn, 544 A.2d 1094, 1095 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (agency not
required to expunge when apparently not party to expungement action and not directed to
expunge under court's order).
84 See Chastain, 510 F.2d at 1235-36 (citing Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955)).
85 See Commonwealth v. C.B., 452 A.2d 1372, 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (granting per-
son unlawfully committed to state mental institution right to destruction of hospital records
"created as a result of the illegal commitment").
86 See Chastain, 510 F.2d at 1236-38 (court may order expungement of FBI personnel
records).
87 See United States v. Bagley, 899 F.2d 707, 708 (8th Cir.) (district court's decision on
expungement is reviewed under abuse of discretion standard), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 343
(1990); United States v. Friesen, 853 F.2d 816, 817-18 (10th Cir. 1988) (decision on expunge-
ment is "committed to the discretion of the trial court"); United States v. International
Harvester Co., 720 F.2d 418, 419 (5th Cir. 1983) (decisions on requests to expunge are re-
viewed under abuse of discretion standard), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 939 (1984).
'8 See, e.g., Friesen, 853 F.2d at 818 (remanding to district court for hearing); United
States v. G., 774 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985) (remanding to district court for taking of
testimony and development of factual record); Chastain, 510 F.2d at 1237-38 (vacating ex-
pungement order and denying reissue prior to hearing); Strohecker v. Gwinnett County Po-
lice Dep't, 357 S.E.2d 305, 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (under Georgia statute hearing is re-
quired on request for expungement); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 441 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1982) (requiring hearing upon petition to determine whether circumstances called
for expungement).
89 See In re Pflaum, 451 A.2d 1038, 1041 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (due process requires
that hearing be held on motion to expunge).
90 See Friesen, 853 F.2d at 818 (appellate court could not decide propriety of expunc-
tion without evidentiary record); G., 774 F.2d at 1395 (failing to make decision because of
insufficient factual record); see also Chastain, 510 F.2d at 1237-38 (requiring hearing on
merits before expungement could be granted).
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the burden of proof. Some courts have decided that the burden
should be borne by the person seeking expungement,9 ' while others
have determined that it should fall on the government.2 These dif-
ferences exist even when the remedy is provided by statute.93
VI. THE EFFECTS OF EXPUNGEMENT
A. Generally
A court considering a motion to expunge can, of course, deny
the motion. 4 However, if expungement is granted, more questions
remain. Decisions must then be made concerning the relief that
will be provided and the effect that will be given to the expunge-
ment order.
The expungement order could provide for the destruction of
all documents that in any way relate to the incident.9 5 This would
eliminate all traces of the event except for the residuum that re-
mains in the memories of those having knowledge. Destruction of
the records has some appeal, particularly if the objective of ex-
pungement is viewed as attempting to place the individual in the
same position as he or she would have been in had the incident not
91 The person seeking expungement usually files the motion or action, and the burden
of proof traditionally falls upon the moving party or the plaintiff. See, e.g., Sadiqq v. Bram-
lett, 559 F. Supp. 362, 368-69 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (plaintiff in action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has
burden of proof and must establish prima facie case).
11 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McKee, 516 A.2d 6, 9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (allocating
burden of proof and persuasion to government), appeal denied, 527 A.2d 537 (Pa. 1987).
11 Compare State v. XYZ Corp., 575 A.2d 423, 426-27 (N.J. 1990) (government bears
burden of proof under New Jersey statute) with Harris v. State, 733 S.W.2d 710, 711 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987) (person seeking expungement bears burden of proof under Texas statute).
94 See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 899 F.2d 707, 708 (8th Cir.) (denying expungement
where case dismissed because of suppression of evidence), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 343
(1990); United States v. Doe, 859 F.2d 1334, 1335-36 (8th Cir. 1988) (denying expungement
based on holding that Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (repealed
1984), did not authorize expungement of record); United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536,
540 (2d Cir. 1977) (problem of rabbinical student requiring explanation of arrest did not
justify expungement), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978); United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925,
928 (10th Cir.) (mere acquittal insufficient to require expungement), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
836 (1975); Crow v. Kelley, 512 F.2d 752, 755-56 (8th Cir. 1975) (expungement denied be-
cause of failure to exhaust state and local remedies); see also Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d
1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1972) (court's limited privilege of expungement should be exercised
sparingly and decision should be made by appropriate authorities).
"' See, e.g., Commonwealth v. J.T., 420 A.2d 1064, 1065-66 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (order-
ing mental commitment record to be destroyed rather than sealed).
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occurred. 6 In reality, the physical destruction of all records
presents great difficulties. Many jurisdictions limit the number of
times that expungement may be granted.9 7 Thus, at a minimum,
the records of expungement must be available to determine
whether expungement should be ordered in a subsequent case.
Courts have, therefore, rarely ordered the physical destruction of
the documents, but have instead simply enjoined dissemination of
the information or provided that the records be sealed.98
B. Disclosure of Expunged Information
Questions relating to the physical maintenance of the ex-
punged records are easily resolved. A more difficult issue is
whether the expunged information should be disclosed, and, if so,
under what circumstances. Here again, the court could order that
all records be expunged,99 and that the information not be availa-
ble for any purpose. As previously noted, however, in many juris-
dictions the records must at least be available to determine
whether expungement should be granted in a subsequent case.100
Courts and legislatures have determined that considerations of
public policy may compel the disclosure of expunged records in
other circumstances as well."0 ' In those jurisdictions, 'the records
may be available for certain limited purposes, including considera-
tion in background investigations for employment in government
"B See United States v. Fryer, 402 F. Supp. 831, 834 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (expungement
redefines defendant's status to position occupied before event), aff'd, 545 F.2d 11 (6th Cir.
1976); J.T., 420 A.2d at 1065-66 (justice demands that person deserving of expungement
order be returned to same position as prior to incident).
"7 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Iacino, 411 A.2d 754, 756 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (under
Pennsylvania statute expungement available as matter of right only once and list main-
tained to determine eligibility for future expungement).
08 See, e.g., Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (placing expunged FBI
records in separate storage facility to preserve availability in course of bona fide criminal
investigation); United States v. Henderson, 482 F. Supp. 234, 245 (D.N.J. 1979) (same);
Commonwealth v. Vickey, 412 N.E.2d 877, 879 (Mass. 1980) (under Massachusetts statutes
records are sealed).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 714 F. Supp. 522, 525 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (ordering
expungement of arrest record and all other records relating to case); United States v. Ben-
lizar, 459 F. Supp. 614, 623-25 (D.D.C. 1978) (records of conviction and arrest destroyed
after reversal on appeal); United States v. Bohr, 406 F. Supp. 1218, 1218 (E.D. Wis. 1976)
(expunging all references to arrest and indictment); State v. P.A.D., 436 N.W.2d 808, 810
(Minn. Ct. App, 1989) (authorizing expungement of all criminal records); J.T., 420 A.2d at
1065-66 (ordering that mental commitment record be destroyed rather than sealed).
100 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
"' See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
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positions,102 criminal investigations or other legitimate law enforce-
ment purposes,03 and affording protection against secret arrests.1 4
The issue of disclosure of expunged records has also arisen in
cases involving the hiring or retention of individuals in sensitive
positions such as court administrators,'0 5 school teachers, 0 6 correc-
tions guards, and police officers.10 7 In such cases it must be decided
whether policy considerations militate more strongly in favor of
preserving the confidentiality of the criminal record or protecting
the public at large. Similar concerns may arise when the person is
running for public office,' 08 applying for admission to the bar, 0 9
102 See, e.g., Dubuclet v. Division of Employment Sec., 483 So. 2d 1183, 1185 (La. Ct.
App.) (under Louisiana statute expunged conviction could be considered with regard to em-
ployment as public school teacher), writ denied, 488 So. 2d 693 (La. 1986); In re Diane M.,
566 A.2d 108, 110 (Md. 1989) (under Maryland statute expungement did not extend to juve-
nile court or Department of Juvenile Services); Vickey, 412 N.E.2d at 879 (under Massachu-
setts statutes sealed records may be made available to any appointing agency).
103 See, e.g., Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (expunged FBI
records must be placed in separate storage facility and used only in connection with bona
fide criminal investigation); United States v. Henderson, 482 F. Supp. 234, 245 (D.N.J. 1979)
(same); State v. L.K., 359 N.W.2d 305, 308-09 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (under Minnesota
statute police reports and audio tapes are not subject to expungement); State ex rel. Knight
v. Barnes, 723 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (under Missouri statute expunged crimi-
nal records available to courts, law enforcement, and administrative agencies for prosecu-
tion, sentencing, parole consideration, and investigative purposes); State v. A.N.J., 487 A.2d
324, 328 (N.J. 1985) (law enforcement would be aware of expunged record if individual ap-
plied for pretrial intervention or handgun license).
104 See Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 973 (D.C. Cir.) (inappropriate to expunge
precinct arrest books of value in preventing secret arrests), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973);
Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 741-42 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (expungement of
precinct arrest books that prevent secret arrests is not required).
"I0 See, e.g., Diamond v. United States, 649 F.2d 496, 497 n.2 (7th Cir. 1981) (person
seeking expungement represented that criminal record would prevent his consideration for
position of chief administrator of court).
.0. Compare Dubuclet, 483 So. 2d at 1185 (expunged conviction could be considered in
discharging teacher) with Warren County Sch. Dist. v. Carlson, 418 A.2d 810, 813 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1980) (expunged criminal record could not be considered in discharging
teacher).
10I See, e.g., Barnett v. Department of Employment Servs., 491 A.2d 1156, 1158, 1164
(D.C. 1985) (corrections guard who failed to disclose expunged felony conviction when ap-
plying for position did not obtain employment by fraudulent means and upon discharge was
entitled to unemployment compensation); Doe v. Department of Pub. Safety, 782 P.2d 489,
494-95 (Utah 1989) (under Utah expungement statute, Department of Public Safety could
not consider expunged conviction record of applicant for employment with Department of
Corrections).
l0 See, e.g., State v. Bissantz, 532 N.E.2d 126, 130 (Ohio 1988) (under Ohio statute
person convicted of bribery in office is barred from holding public office even though convic-
tion expunged); see also Bahr v. Statesman Journal Co., 624 P.2d 664, 666-67 (Or. Ct. App.)
(dismissing defamation suit brought by former candidate for public office because defendant
permitted to rely on expunged conviction to prove veracity of statement), review denied,
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seeking a license to practice medicine or pharmacy,110 or requesting
a permit to carry a firearm."'
Courts traditionally consider prior criminal records in deter-
mining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case, 1 2 and prior
convictions serve as the bases of prosecutions under predicate of-
fense statutes and recidivist statutes." 3 Thus, if the confidentiality
of an expunged criminal record were preserved, a defendant could
receive a substantially lighter sentence or perhaps even escape
prosecution. Insurers have sought information about expunged
traffic convictions for use in determining whether to afford cover-
age," 4 and parties have attempted to use expunged records to at-
tack the credibility of witnesses in court proceedings."15
631 P.2d 341 (Or. 1981).
109 In re Howard C., 407 A.2d 1124, 1124 (Md. 1979) (over' strong dissent, expunged
convictions of petty theft were not considered in admission to bar); State ex rel. Oklahoma
Bar Ass'n v. Denton, 598 P.2d 663, 664-65 (Okla. 1979) (expunged conviction not considered
in bar association disciplinary proceeding).
11 State ex rel. Peach v. Tillman, 615 S.W.2d 514, 518-19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (denying
expungement of medical doctor's conviction of mingling poison with food or medicine under
Missouri statute); Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Friendly Drugs, 499 N.E.2d 361, 363-64
(Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (under Ohio statute Board of Pharmacy could question applicant for
pharmacy license about expunged drug convictions).
" See People v. Bell, 778 P.2d 129, 152-54 (Cal. 1989) (defendant whose felony convic-
tion was expunged under California statute could thereafter be convicted of felony offense
of possession of concealable firearm), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2576 (1990); State v. Thomas,
665 P.2d 914, 916 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (under Washington statute expunged felony could
serve as predicate offense for crime of possession of pistol by felon).
112 See State ex rel. Knight v. Barnes, 723 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (under
Missouri statute expunged criminal records were available to courts for purposes of sentenc-
ing); State v. XYZ Corp., 575 A.2d 423, 426 (N.J. 1990) (same under New Jersey statute);
see also People v. Smith, 470 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Mich. 1991) (expunged juvenile record could
be considered when sentencing adult defendant); People v. Jones, 433 N.W.2d 829, 830
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing expunged juvenile record to be considered at sentencing in
order to properly tailor sentence to particular offender). But see United States v. Beaulieau,
No. 91-1290 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1992) (expunged juvenile conviction may not be considered
under federal sentencing guidelines).
"3 See Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 122 (1983) (federal authori-
ties prosecuting federal gun control laws requiring predicate offense were not bound by state
expungement orders); Thomas, 665 P.2d at 916 (under Washington statute expunged felony
could serve as predicate offense for crime of possession of pistol by felon); see also Stanton
v. State, 686 P.2d 587, 589 (Wyo. 1984) (expungement not granted to person concerned
about being sentenced as habitual criminal-control over punishment is province of
legislature).
14 See, e.g., Brown v. Passidomo, 486 N.Y.S.2d 986, 990 (Sup. Ct. Erie Cty. 1985)
(prohibiting Department of Motor Vehicles from furnishing insurance companies with ex-
punged records pertaining to vehicle violations).
I See State v. Sims, 746 S.W.2d 191, 199 (Tenn. 1988) (prosecutor wrongly permitted
to ask character witness about defendant's expunged arrest record); Meyer v. Kendig, 641
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The decision of whether to permit disclosure can affect the
outcome of civil cases.116 For example, newspapers seek to use the
expunged records in the defense of defamation actions, 11 and con-
sideration of such records can result in the disqualification of a
person from entitlement to government benefits." 8
C. Permitting a Negative Response
One of the most fascinating questions relating to expungement
is whether the person whose record has been expunged will be per-
mitted to deny that the incident occurred. As noted above, this
question raises interesting theoretical and practical issues." 9
The case of Bahr v. Statesman Journal Co.' 20 provides an ex-
cellent example of the difficulties that can arise when a beneficiary
of an expungement order is permitted to deny that the incident
occurred. The plaintiff, Mr. Bahr, was convicted of embezzlement
in 1964, but the record was later expunged under an Oregon stat-
ute providing that "such conviction, arrest or other proceeding
shall be deemed not to have occurred, and the applicant may an-
swer accordingly any questions relating to their occurrence.' 12' In
1978, Mr. Bahr was a candidate for county commissioner when, in
P.2d 1235, 1241-42 (Wyo. 1982) (trial court properly excluded cross-examination concerning
expunged felony conviction). See generally Allyson Dunn, Note, Juvenile Court Records:
Confidentiality vs. The Public's Right to Know, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 379, 393-96 (1986)
(discussing use of juvenile records at trial for impeachment and other purposes); O'Hern,
supra note 2, at 590-600 (discussing admissibility of expunged convictions at trial for im-
peachment and other purposes).
116 See, e.g., Barnes, 723 S.W.2d at 593 (insurance carrier unable to defend against
breach of contract suit because not entitled to confidential closed criminal file of employee
of insured).
1 Compare Stephens v. Van Arsdale, 608 P.2d 972, 985-86 (Kan. 1980) (Kansas ex-
pungement statute does not deny press right to assert truth as defense in libel and slander
actions) and Bahr v. Statesman Journal Co., 624 P.2d 664, 666-67 (Or. Ct. App.) (defama-
tion suit against newspaper brought by former candidate for public office with expunged
conviction dismissed), review denied, 631 P.2d 341 (Or. 1981) with State ex rel. Curtis v.
Crow, 580 S.W.2d 753, 758 (Mo. 1979) (expunged criminal file not available to newspaper in
defense against libel action).
118 Compare Barnett v. Department of Employment Servs., 491 A.2d 1156, 1164 (D.C.
1985) (corrections guard who failed to disclose expunged felony conviction when applying
for position did not obtain employment by fraudulent means and upon discharge was enti-
tled to unemployment compensation) with Dubuclet v. Division of Employment Sec., 483
So. 2d 1183, 1185 (La. Ct. App.) (teacher discharged because of expunged conviction could
be denied unemployment compensation benefits), writ denied, 488 So. 2d 693 (La. 1986).
119 See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
120 624 P.2d 664 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 631 P.2d 341 (Or. 1981).
121 OR. REv. STAT. § 137.225(4) (1989).
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response to a newspaper reporter's question, he stated, "I have no
record of convictions. My record is clean. I have never been con-
victed of embezzlement.112 2 In a report of the interview, the de-
fendant newspaper related that although Mr. Bahr denied having a
criminal record, he had in fact served a four-month jail sentence
following his conviction for embezzlement. 123 Mr. Bahr was there-
fore not only accused of being a criminal, but a liar as well. He
brought a defamation action against the newspaper, but the court
dismissed the action, holding that truth was an absolute defense. 24
It is rather interesting that the same court system, if not the same
court, that expunged Mr. Bahr's conviction and decreed that it
never occurred, then held a recitation of the event to be the truth.
Problems may also develop if the organization making an in-
quiry, such as a committee of bar examiners in another jurisdic-
tion, refuses to recognize an expungement order that permits the
beneficiary to deny that the incident ever occurred. On the other
hand, an expungement order is of little value if the beneficiary is
not permitted to make such a denial. 25 It is not surprising that the
courts have expressed conflicting views on this issue.126
A related issue deserving consideration is whether the states
can provide that the individual may deny the criminal record in
connection with a federal investigation or federal proceeding. It
may well be that any attempt to do so would be ineffective. 27
122 Bahr, 624 P.2d at 666.
123 Id. at 665-66.
124 Id. at 666-67.
125 See supra text accompanying note 2.
120 Compare Commonwealth v. Vickey, 412 N.E.2d 877, 879 (Mass. 1980) (under Mas-
sachusetts statutes, person whose record is sealed may deny record of arrest or conviction on
employment applications, and Commissioner must corroborate statement) and State v. C.A.,
304 N.W.2d 353, 362 (Minn. 1981) (under Minnesota controlled substances statute, person
with expunged record is free to deny or omit mention of arrest, charge, and trial without
running afoul of perjury statutes) and Doe v. Department of Pub. Safety, 782 P.2d 489, 491
(Utah 1989) (Utah statute provides that person whose criminal record has been expunged
may respond to employer inquiries as though arrest or conviction had not occurred) with
Dubuclet v. Division of Employment Sec., 483 So. 2d 1183, 1185 (La. Ct. App.) (under Loui-
siana expungement statute, proceedings not deemed conviction could disqualify person from
unemployment compensation benefits), writ denied, 488 So. 2d 693 (La. 1986) and State v.
Chambers, 533 P.2d 876, 878 (Utah 1975) (under applicable expungement statute, court
could not provide that defendant could respond to inquiries as though conviction never
occurred).
Similar conflicting opinions arose under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 5005-5026 (repealed 1984). See supra note 39.
117 See infra text accompanying notes 145-48.
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D. Sanctions for Unauthorized Disclosure
Courts and legislatures have also provided for sanctions for
the unauthorized disclosure of expunged criminal records. These
have ranged from civil liability to criminal penalties. 12s The possi-
bility of sanctions can create difficult situations for custodians of
records, particularly if they are called upon personally to provide
information when disclosure may be authorized. In such cases, the
custodian may be well advised to seek a court order authorizing
release of the records.
VII. Dickerson v. New Banner Institute
A. The Dickerson Case and the Congressional Response
The United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to pro-
vide guidance in the area of federal expungement when the case of
Dickerson v. New Banner Institute,'2 9 came before the Court in
1983. Dickerson arose out of the revocation of New Banner's fed-
eral licenses to manufacture, collect, and sell firearms. 13 0 The Gun
Control Act of 1968 ls' disqualified a corporation from obtaining
such licenses if an individual in a management or control position
had been convicted of a felony. 32 The United States Treasury's
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms issued the licenses to
New Banner, but later moved to revoke them when it learned that
the chairman of the board, Mr. Kennison, had been convicted of a
state felony in Iowa. 33 Mr. Kennison's conviction for carrying a
concealed weapon had not been reported on New Banner's license
application because the criminal record had been expunged under
Iowa law.131
128 See, e.g., State ex rel. Knight v. Barnes, 723 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(under Missouri statute violation of confidentiality requirements constituted misdemeanor);
Warren County Sch. Dist. v. Carlson, 418 A.2d 810, 813 n.5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) (Penn-
sylvania statute provided criminal sanctions if expunged criminal record used for public or
private purpose); see also Doe v. FBI, 718 F. Supp. 90, 94 (D.D.C. 1989) (Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(C), provides for civil action in certain situations where agency maintains
inaccurate information), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 936 F.2d 1346 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
129 460 U.S. 103 (1983).
120 Id. at 108-09.
121 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930 (1988).
32 Id. § 923(d)(1)(B).
122 Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 108-09.
"' Id. at 106-08.
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In the majority opinion devoted largely to statutory construc-
tion and Congressional intent in enacting the Gun Control Act,
Justice Blackmun held that federal authorities were not bound by
the Iowa expungement order.135 Accordingly, the Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco and Firearms was permitted to consider the Iowa
conviction.13" More important, however, is the Court's holding that
federal disabilities may be constitutionally attached to an ex-
punged conviction. 137 Justice Blackmun discussed the national
patchwork of expungement laws and the perplexing problems that
would arise if federal authorities were required to give individual-
ized treatment to each state expungement statute. 38
Congress decided to reintroduce these perplexing problems
into federal jurisprudence. The Firearms Owners' Protection Act
enacted in 1986 consolidated the federal gun control statutes. 39
The Act prohibits the shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiv-
ing of firearms by persons who have been convicted of crimes pun-
ishable by imprisonment for more than one year. 40 The Act also
specifically provides that a conviction expunged by a state, in most
cases, cannot be considered as a predicate conviction.14 '
B. Federal Expungement Law Post-Dickerson
It is clear that state law on expungement controls cases com-
ing under the Firearms Owners' Protection Act. However, both the
United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have
expressed the view that the Dickerson holding has continued vital-
ity with regard to matters not covered by the Act.12 An examina-
I" Id. at 114-15.
136 Id. at 110-22.
137 See id. at 115.
18 Id. at 121-22.
'" Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1988)).
10 Id. § 102(6), 100 Stat. at 452 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988)).
14 Id. § 101(5), 100 Stat. at 450 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)).
12 See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2154 (1990) (citing Dickerson for
proposition that federal laws, absent plain indication to contrary, are not to be construed so
that their application depends on state law); United States v. Holley, 818 F.2d 351, 352-54
(5th Cir. 1987). The Holley court declined to annul Dickerson, rejecting the argument that
the Court in Dickerson misinterpreted the law, and held that Dickerson applies to cases
brought before the enactment of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act. Id. The court further
noted that the Act's legislative history does not suggest an intent to affect the holding of
Dickerson other than as to its specific prospective application to gun control. Id.; see also
United States v. Pennon, 816 F.2d 527, 529 (10th Cir.) (noting Congressional intent that
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tion of post-Dickerson developments supports this conclusion. In
the Dickerson opinion, the Court held that "absent plain indica-
tion to the contrary, federal laws are not to be construed so that
their application is dependent on state law, 'because the applica-
tion of federal legislation is nationwide and at times the federal
program would be impaired if state law were to control.' ,,143 Con-
gress was aware of this holding when it passed the Firearms Own-
ers' Protection Act. Nonetheless, the Act is narrow in scope, chang-
ing only the prospective effect of state expungement on cases
arising under the federal gun control laws. Apparently, Congress
made a conscious decision not to otherwise alter the effect of Dick-
erson, either on federal gun control cases brought before the adop-
tion of the Act or on other areas such as the federal narcotics
laws.144 This history indicates a Congressional intent that Dicker-
son should continue to control in areas not specifically covered by
the Act.
If the courts are correct, and this application of Dickerson was
the intent of Congress, the result is important: in areas where there
is no federal legislation, Dickerson controls. In these areas, disabil-
ities can be constitutionally attached to expunged convictions, and
"expunction does not alter the legality of the previous conviction
and does not signify that the defendant was innocent of the crime
to which he pleaded guilty."'1 45 More important, "in the absence of
a plain indication of an intent to incorporate diverse state laws
into a federal criminal statute, the meaning of the federal statute
should not be dependent on state law.' ' 46 In other words, in the
absence of statute, federal authorities are not bound by state ex-
Dickerson should control cases arising before adoption of Firearms Owners' Protection Act),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 987 (1987).
"' Taylor, 110 S. Ct. at 2154 (citing Dickerson for quoted proposition and quoting in
part from Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 119-20).
.. See Holley, 818 F.2d at 352-54 (holding that Dickerson applies to cases brought
before enactment of Firearms Owners' Protection Act). One federal district court noted that
when Congress adopted the Firearms Owners' Protection Act and made the determination
of the presence or absence of a conviction dependent on state law, it did not amend the
narcotics statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1988), which provides for enhanced penalties based on
prior convictions. See United States v. Petros, 747 F. Supp. 368, 375 (E.D. Mich. 1990). The
court in Petros implied that the failure of Congress to amend the narcotics statute may
indicate a Congressional intent that Dickerson apply to narcotics cases. Id. If so, state ex-
pungement orders would not be binding on federal authorities in those cases.
Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 115.
14 See Taylor, 110 S. Ct. at 2154 (quoting United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411
(1957)); see also Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 119-20 (implying that Congress did not intend to
allow state expunction laws to remove disabilities imposed by federal firearms statutes).
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pungement orders.
It is not clear that this broad statement always holds true. If,
however, in the absence of statute, federal authorities are not
bound by state expungement orders, the results would be signifi-
cant. Expunged state criminal records could be considered with re-
gard to federal employment, and applicants for federal positions
could be required to reveal the expunged records. In the absence of
a statute, such records could be considered in connection with bail
or sentencing proceedings in federal court. Moreover, expunged
state convictions could serve as predicate offenses or could enhance
penalties under federal criminal statutes. This application would
lead to the rather anomalous result of precluding the use of the
conviction as a predicate offense under the gun control laws, while
permitting it to be used to enhance a penalty under other provi-
sions, such as the federal narcotics statute.1 47 Perhaps most impor-
tant, these uses would provide federal record-keeping agencies,
such as the FBI, with justification for maintaining these records
and for providing the information to other federal agencies. In fact,
federal law may require that they do so.14' The combined effect of
these developments would substantially reduce the effectiveness of
state expungement orders.
VIII. THE NEED FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. Background
At first glance, expungement appears to be a rather simple
concept. Upon further reflection, however, it becomes apparent
that this area, far from being simple, is a labyrinth of complex le-
gal issues and difficult value judgments. The determination of
whether to expunge a criminal record is further complicated in
cases where the person has been convicted of a serious offense or
where expungement of the record could lead to rapes or child
abuse that might otherwise have been prevented. 149 Similarly, is-
sues of expungement may be viewed differently when a person
"7 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (1988) (state expunged conviction cannot be consid-
ered as predicate conviction) with Petros, 747 F. Supp. at 375 (implying that federal author-
ities may not be bound by state expungement orders when applying federal narcotics stat-
ute, 21 U.S.C. § 841).
48 See 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1988) (requiring Attorney General to acquire, preserve, and
exchange identification records).
49 See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
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with an expunged conviction is admitted to the bar and once again
perpetrates offenses on innocent clients.150 We have also seen the
difficulties that can arise when an individual whose criminal record
has been expunged is permitted to deny that the event ever oc-
curred. 15' On the other hand, expungement may appear to be ap-
propriate, or even required, when an obvious injustice has occurred
or when the circumstances indicate that the individual should be
given the opportunity to start anew with a clean record.'52
If the remedy of expungement is made available, many diffi-
cult issues remain. Do the courts have the inherent power to act, or
is this matter solely within the province of the legislature? What
criteria will be used in determining whether expungement will be
granted in a particular case? What positions will be taken on the
issue of federalism and the other important procedural issues that
will arise? What effect will be given to the expungement order?
Will the beneficiary of the order be permitted to deny that the
event ever occurred? Resolution of these issues requires the bal-
ancing of a number of important and competing policy
considerations.
B. The Problem
Efforts to resolve these issues on the federal level have been,
for the most part, unsuccessful. The federal law on expungement is
in a state of uncertainty and confusion. It is unclear whether fed-
eral authorities, in areas not covered by a specific federal statute,
are bound by state expungement orders.53 If they are not, we are
left with a situation in which a state conviction that may serve as a
predicate offense under one federal statute will not constitute a
predicate offense under another. 54 In the area of gun control, resi-
dents of one state are treated differently from the residents of an-
other, 55 and state legislatures can nullify the effect of the federal
150 See supra text accompanying note 4.
... See supra text accompanying notes 2, 121-26.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 12-26.
153 See supra text accompanying notes 142-148.
' For example, while an expunged state conviction may not serve as a predicate of-
fense under the Firearms Owners' Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), it may be consid-
ered for purposes of enhancing the sentence in a narcotics case under 21 U.S.C. § 841. See
United States v. Petros, 747 F. Supp. 368, 375 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (implying that failure of
Congress to amend 21 U.S.C. § 841 may indicate Congressional intent that federal authori-
ties not be bound by state expungement orders in narcotics cases).
15' Under the Firearms Owners' Protection Act, individuals convicted of felonies in
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criminal law merely by passing a statute.'56 In most cases, the ef-
fects of expungement are less than clear, and the beneficiary of an
expungement order will be unsure of his or her rights.
It is clear that resolution of these issues cannot be left to the
courts. The present state of federal law is, to a great extent, the
result of our attempt to develop a coherent body of expungement
law through the decisional rather than the legislative process. The
courts themselves have recognized that determinations regarding
expungement are more appropriately made by the legislature. 157
Although there are a few federal statutes addressing expunge-
ment,158 they are concerned with specific areas and provide little
assistance in answering the difficult questions and formulating a
consistent policy. As a result, these questions have been left to the
courts. The courts, in turn, have taken divergent views and, with
some candor, have openly stated that they do not feel obliged to
follow each other's decisions.'59 We are left with a turbid body of
New Jersey, Missouri, and Indiana may be subject to federal criminal prosecution for pos-
sessing a firearm, while those similarly convicted in Idaho and Minnesota may be immune
from federal prosecution. Compare United States v. Breckenridge, 899 F.2d 540, 543 (6th
Cir.) (felon convicted in New Jersey could be convicted under federal law of possession of
firearm), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 119 (1990); Presley v. United States, 851 F.2d 1052, 1053
(8th Cir. 1988) (same in Missouri) and United States v. Landaw, 727 F. Supp. 481, 483
(N.D. Ind. 1989) (same in Indiana) with United States v. Gomez, 911 F.2d 219, 222 (9th Cir.
1990) (felon convicted under Idaho law could not be convicted under federal law for possess-
ing firearm) and United States v. Traxel, 914 F.2d 119, 125 (8th Cir. 1990) (same under
Minnesota law).
161 But see Landaw, 727 F. Supp. at 483. The Landaw court indicated that, notwith-
standing a provision in the Indiana statute restoring civil rights upon the completion of
sentence, a felon could still be prosecuted under the Firearms Owners' Protection Act. Id.
The court noted that any other interpretation would render the federal gun control laws a
nullity in the state of Indiana. Id.
'5 See United States v. Doe, 732 F.2d 229, 232 (1st Cir. 1984) (decision whether record
should be expunged under Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (repealed 1984), was
matter for legislative, not judicial, determination); United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927
(10th Cir.) (historically, courts have viewed matter of expungement of record of acquitted
defendant as more appropriately left to legislature), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975); Tarl-
ton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (recognizing Congress as more appropri-
ate forum for making determinations regarding expungement); Springer v. State, 621 P.2d
1213, 1217 (Or. Ct. App.) (decisions about expungement best left to legislature), review de-
nied, 631 P.2d 341 (Or. 1981). In an interesting analysis, the Supreme Court of Wyoming
held that court-ordered expungement in the absence of statute would have the effect of a
pardon and would therefore constitute an unconstitutional violation of the separation of
powers doctrine. See Stanton v. State, 686 P.2d 587, 588-89 (Wyo. 1984).
"s See supra note 26.
"9 See United Stated v. Henderson, 482 F. Supp. 234, 237 (D.N.J 1979) (noting split
among circuits on issue of whether expungement was required under Youth Corrections Act,
18 U.S.C. § 5021 (repealed 1984)); Rowlett v. Fairfax, 446 F. Supp. 186, 188-89 (W.D. Mo.
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law that leads to uncertainty in an area where certainty is
required.
Moreover, the determination of these issues cannot be left to
the states. The nationwide character of federal law requires that it
be uniformly applied to all citizens from coast to coast.16 0 If the
application of federal statutes is made dependent upon state law, a
state legislature, merely by passing a law, can defeat the purpose
and effect of a federal criminal statute.16 Residents of different
states will be treated differently. A person imprudent enough to
commit a crime in a state that does not have an expungement stat-
ute may be left with a predicate offense and subject to prosecution
for a federal crime, while a person convicted in a state with an
expungement statute may be immune from federal prosecution.162
Inequality may also arise with regard to consideration of the con-
viction for purposes of setting bail or sentencing.
The Court in Dickerson noted the perplexing problems that
arise when federal authorities are required to interpret and give
effect to the patchwork of state laws on expungement. These
problems inhibit the effective enforcement of federal criminal law
and create uncertainty for both law enforcement and those subject
to the law. 163 Both prosecutors and potential defendants are re-
1978) (remarking that District of Columbia Circuit's holding in Tarlton, 507 F.2d at 1122,
that FBI has duty to ensure its records are accurate has not been well received by other
federal courts); Coleman v. United States Dep't of Justice, 429 F. Supp. 411, 413 (N.D. Ind.
1977) (court not bound by expungement cases from District of Columbia Circuit).
160 See Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2154 (1990) (refusing to make applica-
tion of federal criminal statute dependent upon state definition of burglary because identi-
cal conduct would receive different treatment under federal law depending on state of
conviction).
101 See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing power of state legislatures to
nullify effects of federal criminal law).
02 See supra note 155 (discussing disparate results among states in area of gun
control).
Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 121. The Court stated the following:
Finally, a rule that would give effect to expunctions under varying state stat-
utes would seriously hamper effective enforcement of Title IV. Over half the
States have enacted one or more statutes that may be classified as expunction
provisions that attempt to conceal prior convictions or to remove some of their
collateral or residual effects. These statutes differ, however, in almost every partic-
ular. Some are applicable only to young offenders, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws
§§ 780.621 and .622 (1982). Some are available only to persons convicted of cer-
tain offenses, e.g., N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:52-2(b) (West 1982); others, however, per-
mit expunction of a conviction for any crime including murder, e.g., Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann., ch. 276, § 100A (West Supp. 1982-1983). Some are confined to first
offenders, e.g., Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, § 991c (Supp. 1982-1983). Some are discretion-
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quired to speculate whether a conviction has been expunged under
the law of the state with jurisdiction. In many cases, the issue is
determined by an appellate court years after the arrest. This sub-
sequent determination does not provide the certainty that is re-
quired for fair notice to potential defendants. 64
C. The Solution-Federal Legislation
The certainty and consistency so critical in the law of ex-
pungement will be achieved only when Congress passes legislation
that does not defer to state law, but instead states with clarity the
federal policy on this issue. Only then will all citizens be treated
equally, and both law enforcement and potential defendants be
provided with adequate notice of their rights and responsibilities.
The legislative process is particularly well-suited to developing a
coherent policy. The United States Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives can hold hearings and solicit comments from both state
and federal agencies. A designated committee can devote the nec-
essary time and resources to developing information and analyzing
the issues. Congress can then deliberate and formulate both a pol-
icy and the legislation to effectuate that policy on a nationwide
basis.165
Resolution of the problem as a whole is more important than
decisions made on particular issues. It may be decided that ex-
pungement is inappropriate in any situation and that the remedy
will therefore not be granted or recognized in the federal system.
ary, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 638.02(2) (Supp. 1982), while others provide for automatic
expunction under certain circumstances, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-912
(1978). The statutes vary in the language employed to describe what they do.
Some speak of expunging the conviction, others of "sealing" the file or of causing
the dismissal of the charge. The statutes also differ in their actual effect. Some are
absolute; others are limited. Only a minority address questions such as whether
the expunged conviction may be considered in sentencing for a subsequent offense
or in setting bail on a later charge, or whether the expunged conviction may be
used for impeachment purposes, or whether the convict may deny the fact of his
conviction. Some statutes, too, clearly were not meant to prevent use of the con-
viction in a subsequent prosecution.
Id.
164 See, e.g., Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545-46 (1971) (holding that poten-
tial defendant is constitutionally entitled to notice that his or her acts would constitute
criminal violation, and that no person should be held criminally responsible for conduct that
could not reasonably be understood to be proscribed).
115 See Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (with its resources and
fact-finding apparatus, Congress is more appropriate forum for making determinations re-
garding expungement law).
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On the other hand, the statute may provide that federal courts
may grant expungement, and that state convictions may not be
considered by federal authorities, under certain circumstances. If
this remedy is adopted, the statute may provide that the benefi-
ciary of the expungement order is permitted to deny that the event
ever occurred. On the other hand, it may be decided that, while the
record generally will not be considered to the person's prejudice,
no attempt will be made to rewrite history. Whatever decision is
made on the specific issues, the federal statute will eliminate many
of the uncertainties that now exist.
IX. CONCLUSION
Expungement of criminal records is an interesting and contro-
versial area of the law. Whether expungement is an appropriate
remedy is a very real question, and strong policy considerations
militate both in favor of, and in opposition to, its adoption. If the
remedy is adopted, the formulation of the law governing its appli-
cation implicates a complex matrix of difficult value judgments.
Federal jurisprudence in this area is of great importance. It
determines not only the applicability of expungement to federal
cases, but also the relationship between state and federal law and
the effect that federal authorities will give to state expungement
orders. In the past, Congress has elected not to confront the diffi-
cult issues presented by expungement, but instead has deferred to
the courts or has made the effect of federal statutes dependent
upon state law. This position has led to unfortunate results. The
federal courts have openly disagreed on significant issues, potential
defendants and law enforcement have been uncertain of their re-
spective rights and responsibilities, similarly situated defendants
have been treated differently, and states have been able to render
federal criminal statutes nugatory merely by passing legislation.
A definite need exists for legislation that clearly sets forth the
federal policy on expungement of criminal records. The legislative
process is particularly well-suited to formulating a coherent policy
and drafting statutes to ensure its implementation. By enacting
such legislation Congress can provide the certainty required by the
Constitution and guarantee that all citizens receive equal treat-
ment under the law.
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